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THE IRREGULAR ISSUANCE OF WAREHOUSE 
RECEIPTS AND ARTICLE SEVEN OF THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
Douglass G. Boshkoff* 
IRREGULARITIES in the issuance of warehouse receipts provide coun-sel with the opportunity of arguing that the receipt is of no effect 
or that an adverse claimant has no right to property allegedly stored 
with a warehouseman. Such irregularities occur when there is non-
compliance with one of the several statutes which, in a particular 
jurisdiction, may regulate the operations of warehousemen or the 
issuance of warehouse receipts. There may be, first of all, failure to 
comply with the formal requirements for warehouse receipts of Arti-
cle Seven of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code) or its predecessor, 
the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act (UWRA).1 Any deviation from 
these requirements may encourage arguments in opposition to rights 
derived from the document, such arguments being limited only by 
the extent of counsel's ingenuity. For example, both the Code2 and 
the UWRA3 require that a warehouse receipt contain a statement 
of the rate of storage and handling charges to be claimed by the 
bailee. Where this statement has been omitted, it has been argued 
that title based on the warehouse receipt is invalid,4 that the ware-
houseman does not enjoy the statutory right of interpleader,5 and 
that the warehouseman is not entitled to any compensation for his 
storage services.6 
Co-existing with the Code and UWRA in some states are statutes 
regulating the issuance of warehouse receipts for certain types of 
commodities, usually farm produce.7 These statutes generally were 
• Professor of Law, Indiana University. Visiting Professor of Law, Boston College 
(1966-1967). A.B. 1952, LL.B. 1955, Harvard University.-Ed. The author wishes to ac-
knowledge the research assistance of Jon Hall, LL.B. 1964, Indiana University. 
1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-201(15), (45); 7-102(l)(h), -104(1), -201, -202 [here-
inafter cited as U.C.C.]; UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS Ar:r §§ 1, 2, 4, 5, 58(1) [herein-
after cited as U.W.R.A.J. 
2. U.C.C. § 7-202(2){e). 
3. U.W.R.A. § 2{e). 
4. Smith Bros. v. Richheimer &: Co., 145 La. 1066, 83 So. 255 (1919) (argument 
rejected). 
5. New Jersey Title Guar. &: Trust Co. v. Rector, 76 N.J. Eq. 587, 75 Atl. 931 (Ct. Err. 
&: App. 1910) {argument rejected). But cf. Maxwell v. Winans, 96 N.J. Eq. 178, 125 Atl. 
38 (Ch. 1924). 
6. Finn v. Erickson, 127 Ore. 107, 269 Pac. 232 (1928) (warehouseman entitled to 
reasonable compensation); cf. State Bank v. Almira Farmer's Warehouse Co., 123 Wash. 
354, 212 Pac. 543 (1923) {so many terms were missing that documents were not ware-
house reecipts and bailee could claim lien for advances not noted on the document). 
7. E.g., ARK. STAT, ANN. §§ 77-1201 through -1227 (1957); Iu.. REv. STAT. ch. 114, 
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adopted prior to enactment of the UWRA when there was no general 
control of the issuance of warehouse receipts. They remain in force 
despite successive adoptions of the UWRA and the Code because 
they contain specialized regulation to meet the needs of a particular 
kind of commerce. An irregularity can occur when there is non-
compliance with this specialized type of legislation even though there 
has been compliance with the Code or UWRA, as for instance, where 
such a statute requires the inclusion of terms not made mandatory 
by either the UWRA or the Code.8 Failure to include such terms 
might thus prompt an assertion that the warehouse receipt is invalid.9 
A third type of statute which must be considered is one which 
regulates the business of warehousing and requires that public ware-
houses be licensed and bonded.10 Some irregularities giving rise to 
litigation are traceable to non-compliance with this type of statute. 
In the typical case, the warehouseman accepts goods for deposit at a 
time when it is unlicensed; it is then argued that the lack of a license 
affects the title-transmitting aspect of the receipt11 or renders the 
bailee liable in an action for conversion.12 
The draftsmen of Article Seven were well aware of the problems 
caused by irregular issuance of warehouse receipts and there will be 
fewer problems of irregularity under the Code for two reasons. First, 
the Code's formal requirements for issuance of warehouse receipts 
are less stringent than are those imposed by the UWRA, thereby 
lessening the chances of any irregularity occurring. Second, the Code 
contains two sections which aim to minimize the consequences of any 
irregularities which may occur.13 In this article I will discuss the 
types of defects that have been troublesome over the years, focussing 
on the ways in which they have arisen, but also discussing some of 
their particularly troublesome consequences; then I shall consider 
§§ 293-326a (1963) (storage of grain, soybeans and cowpeas); IowA CODE §§ 543.1-.38 
(1962). 
8. E.g., IowA CoDE § 543.18 (1962), as amended, Iowa Acts 1965, No. 61 G.A., ch. 413, 
§ 10124, requires, in addition to the terms required by U.C.C. § 7-201(2), a description 
by "grade or other class" of stored agricultural products. GA. CODE ANN. § lll-513(j) 
(1959), requires a statement of the amount and rate of insurance on the goods. 
9. No cases have been discovered in which there was compliance with the UWRA 
but non-compliance with a parallel regulatory statute of this type. The case most 
nearly in point is Central Nat'! Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 324 F.2d 830, 831 (7th 
Cir. 1963), in which the court, for the purpose of argument, assumed a set of facts which 
would have involved a violation of a provision in the Illinois Constitution. 
IO. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 105, § 1 (1954). In some instances, laws regulating 
the issue of warehouse receipts may be combined with those regulating the warehousing 
business as in GA. CODE ANN. §§ 111-501 through -1532 (1959). 
11. Supervisor of Public Accounts v. Paterno Wines & Distilling Corp., 181 La. 814, 
818, 160 So. 423, 424 (1935). 
12. D'Aloisio v. Morton's Inc., 342 Mass. 231, 233, 172 N.E.2d 819, 821 (1961). 
13. u.c.c. §§ 7-401, 10-104. 
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the ways in which the Code affects these irregularities and their 
consequences. 
I. LEGAL DEFECTS IN THE CHARACTER OF THE ISSUER 
A warehouse receipt is created only when a document of a certain 
type is issued by a particular type of bailee. Thus, according to the 
UWRA, the issuer of a warehouse receipt had to be "lawfully en-
gaged in the business of storing goods for profit."14 The UWRA, 
however, did not spell out the requirements of "lawful" conduct of 
business. Rather, the legitimacy of the warehouseman's activity was 
determined by reference to state laws regulating entry into the ware-
housing business. Violations of these state licensing laws, through 
failure to secure a license or post a bond, have been raised in two 
types of cases: in one, the illegal conduct of the issuer has been in-
voked to oppose rights derived from the document; in the second, it 
has been argued that the illegal warehousing activity has affected 
rights not dependent on a valid warehouse receipt. 
Supervisor of Public Accounts v. Patorno Wines b Distilling 
Corp.15 is a case in the first category. There, certain wines were de-
posited in a warehouse by the manufacturer who then pledged the 
receipts as security for a loan. The warehouse was located in a room 
on premises belonging to the manufacturer. The State of Louisiana 
caused a ·writ of attachment to be levied on the wines to satisfy a 
claim for unpaid taxes, and the court favored the claim of the state 
over that of the pledgee because the issuer was not licensed to do 
business at that address. This result is not surprising, for there was 
evidence that the pledgee was well aware of the state's claim and had 
permitted the release of wine on which taxes were unpaid. More-
over, the warehousing arrangement looked suspicious, and the case 
is therefore in line with others which have refused to recognize spu-
rious field warehousing arrangements.16 Patorno is thus an example 
of a case in which rights derived from the document were successfully 
opposed by invoking the invalidity of the alleged warehouse receipt, 
even though such invalidity was the result of the functional char-
acter of the issuer and not the legality of his business operations.17 
Despite the fact that the lack of a warehouseman's license must be 
a somewhat common occurrence, there are few cases which seek to 
14. U.W.R.A. § 58(1). 
15. 181 La. 814, 160 So. 423 (1935). 
16. The development of field warehousing is described in I GILMORE, SECURITY 
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY§§ 6.3-.4 (1965). 
17. This problem reoccurs in the discussion of factual defects in the character of the 
issuer at pp. 1367-68 infra. 
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utilize such an irregularity to cast doubt on the validity of the ware-
house receipt. But in a fairly recent Massachusetts decision18 the 
depositor of goods sought to do just that; in order to avoid the limi-
tation of liability in a warehouse receipt, the depositor attempted to 
establish that the warehouseman had converted the goods (liability 
for conversion not being covered by the exculpatory clause), arguing 
that the conversion arose from the fact that the warehouseman had 
accepted the goods for storage at a time when it was not licensed by 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The argument did not succeed: 
the licensing statute had criminal sanctions for non-compliance and 
the court saw no need to impose the additional sanction of a liability 
for conversion. 
More numerous are cases in the second category, in which the 
asserted illegality is supposed to affect rights that are not dependent 
on a valid warehouse receipt. In most of these cases the issue is 
whether the deposit of goods, usually grain, is a bailment or a sale. 
Here the courts have often attached some weight to the fact that the 
person receiving the goods is not licensed to act as a public ware-
houseman. One of the most unusual of these cases is Green v. For-
tune,19 a Kansas decision in which the lack of a license was dispositive 
of an issue involving the statute of limitations. Wheat was delivered 
to a grain elevator in June and July of 1934. The owner of the wheat 
demanded payment for it in May of 1937 and brought suit to recover 
the value of the grain on January 20, 1938. The applicable statutory 
limitation period was three years, so the plaintiff was barred if his 
action had accrued prior to January 20, 1935. He sought to avoid 
the application of the statute by arguing that the transaction with the 
defendant was a bailment and that the bailee was under no obliga-
tion to re-deliver the wheat, or its cash equivalent, until the demand 
was made in May, 1937. The defendant successfully argued that, be-
cause it did not have a license to operate as a public warehouseman, 
the transaction, as a matter of law, could only have been a sale, and 
a demurrer to the complaint was sustained. It seems erroneous to 
attach such great significance to the lack of a license. The real issue 
is the intent of the parties and, while the lack of a license should be 
considered, it does not follow that as a matter of law bailees should 
always be presumed to have followed a legal course of activity. Thus, 
the plaintiff in Green v. Fortune should have been given the oppor-
tunity to prove that the defendant was operating as a warehouseman, 
,even though unlicensed. 
18. D'Aloisio v. Morton's Inc., 342 Mass. 231, 172 N.E.2d 819 (1961). 
19. 151 Kan. 598, 100 P.2d 631 (1940). 
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There are other cases in which it is indicated that the lack of a 
license makes the transaction a sale, but none in which the position 
is stated as strongly as in Green v. Fortune. In some of these cases 
there was other evidence justifying a finding of a sale, and the failure 
to obtain a license merely supported the conclusion.20 In others, such 
a statement was dictum,21 and some courts have simply refused to 
assign any significance to the lack of a license. In Travelers Indem-
nity Company v. United States,22 one Luder was engaged both in the 
grain merchandising and in the grain storage business. The storage 
business was carried on, properly licensed, at one location, and Lu-
der's grain for his mm account was held at another location for 
which he did not possess a storage license. When Luder went out of 
business the bonding company attempted to argue that it was not 
liable to the plaintiff-bailor because the grain was delivered to Luder 
at Waldo, Kansas, the location where Luder did not have a license 
to engage in the business of storing grain, and the transaction was 
therefore a sale not covered by the bond. There was evidence that 
the plaintiff considered the transaction a bailment and the court re-
fused to follow Green v. Fortune and other Kansas decisions which 
had announced the rule that the lack of a license made the transac-
tion a sale. To the same effect is Hartford Accident and Indemnity 
Co. v. State of Kansas,23 in which grain was received for storage but 
no warehouse receipt was ever issued. The grain was received during 
a period when the bailee's license had lapsed. The license was later 
renewed, and the bond required by statute of all warehousemen was 
back-dated to the day when the previous license had expired. The 
surety company sought to avoid liability on its bond by asserting that 
it had no responsibility for grain deposited with an unlicensed bailee. 
Since the warehouseman could either buy the grain or store it, the 
surety argued that grain received during the period when the license 
was not in force could not be stored grain, but rather must have been 
purchased outright. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument. Pre-
vious Kansas decisions relating the lack of a license to the bailment-
sale issue were summarily distinguished and, in the alternative, the 
court held that the surety company was estopped to deny liability 
because it had back-dated the bond so as to cover the period of un-
20. Schmitz v. Stockman, 151 Kan. 891, 101 P.2d 962 (1940); Kipp v. Goffe&: Carkener, 
144 Kan. 95, 58 P.2d 102 (1936). But in other litigation involving the same grain ele-
vators as in Kipp, the court did not apparently consider the lack of license important. 
See Kipp v. Carlson, 148 Kan. 657, 84 P.2d 899 (1938). 
21. Shugar v. Antrim, 177 Kan. 70, 74, 276 P.2d 372, 375 (1954); Greep v. Bruns, 160 
Kan. 48, 56, 159 P.2d 803, 809 (1945). 
22. 271 F.2d 521 (10th Cir. 1959). 
23. 247 F.2d 315 (10th Cir. 1957). 
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licensed activity. The estoppel argument was a make-weight because 
the plaintiff did not demonstrate reliance, and it is therefore plain 
that the court was simply unwilling to attach any specific significance 
to the lack of license.24 
Aside from state licensing questions, the requirement of the 
UWRA that the issuer of a warehouse receipt be "lawfully" engaged 
in the warehousing business was not functionally significant. The 
theory of the statute was that documents which in some instances 
would embody title to warehoused goods should only be issued by 
a certain type of bailee, but the requirement of lawful engagement 
in business did not help to identify the type of bailee that the drafts-
men of the UWRA had in mind. Therefore, in order to clarify the 
situation, two changes have been made in the Code. First, the re-
quirement that the bailee be "lawfully" engaged in the warehousing 
business has been dropped.25 The only issue now is the factual one 
of determining the nature of the issuer's business. Second, section 
10-104 provides: 
The Article on Documents of Title (Article 7) does not repeal or 
modify any laws prescribing the form or contents of documents of 
title or the services or facilities to be afforded by bailees, or other-
wise regulating bailee's businesses in respects not specifically dealt 
with herein; but the fact that such laws are violated does not effect 
the status of a document of title which otherwise complies with the 
definition of a document of title (Section 1-201). 
It seems pretty clear that as far as rights under the document are 
concerned, counsel will not be able to argue that the lack of a license 
has much significance. But where the litigation does not directly in-
volve rights derived from a warehouse receipt, as in the bailment-sale 
cases, the issue of illegality is still potentially present. The definition 
of warehouseman is not controlling in cases outside the scope of 
Article Seven and the direction to disregard illegality contained in 
section 10-104 is confined to those situations in which the "status of 
a document of title" is at issue. Nevertheless, the decisions in Hart-
ford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. State of K.ansas26 and Travelers 
Indemnity Company v. United States21 hopefully signal a movement 
away from the mechanical analysis of the previous bailment-sale 
cases. 
24. See also Torgerson v. Quinn-Shepherdson Co., 161 Minn. 380, 201 N.W. 615 
(1925) (lack of statutory bond not significant when evidence supported finding of bail-
ment). 
25. See U.C.C. § 7-102(h). 
26. 247 F.2d 315 (10th Cir. 1957). 
27. 271 F.2d 521 (10th Cir. 1959). 
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II. FACTUAL DEFECTS IN THE CHARACTER OF THE ISSUER 
Defects in the status of the issuer of a supposed warehouse receipt 
may be factual instead of legal. In other words, it may be argued that 
the warehouse receipt was invalid because it was not issued by a 
person engaged in the storage business. Under the UWRA, the issuer 
not only had to be lawfully conducting his business, but he also had 
to be "engaged in the business of storing goods for profit."28 Some 
cases made much of the fact that the issuer did not seek a profit29 
from the warehousing operation and consequently invalidated pledges 
of the supposed warehouse receipts. But often the presence or ab-
sence of a profit motive, although given emphasis in the report of the 
case, was only an indicium of whether the issuer was actually in 
the business of warehousing. The courts in these cases80 were appre-
hensive about permitting warehouse receipts to serve as security 
when issued by the owner of the goods. In one of these cases, in 
which the pledgee sought to rely upon the validity of what was al-
leged to be a valid field warehousing arrangement, the court said: 
To uphold and give legal effect to the rights claimed by the inter-
pleaders in this case would destroy all safeguards of statutory law 
enacted to provide for constructive notice of liens and incumbrances 
upon property by persons innocently contracting with reference 
thereto. The fact of the property being stored in a regular ware-
house which is run and operated by a warehouseman engaged in the 
business for profit (as prescribed in the 1938 act) is notice to one 
dealing in any manner with the stored property that warehouse 
receipts might be outstanding against it.81 
The Code, which drops the profit requirement and defines a 
warehouseman as "a person engaged in the business of storing of 
goods for hire,"82 does not affect the holdings in these cases.88 Al-
though the profit requirement is gone, it is still necessary that the 
issuer be engaged in the business of warehousing if the pledge of the 
receipts is to be held valid.84 
28. U.W.R.A. § 58(1). 
29. Continental Can Co. v. Jessamine Canning Co., 286 Ky. 365, 150 S.W.2d 922 
(1941); Moore v. Thomas Moore Distilling Co., 247 Pa. 312, 93 At!. 347 (1915); Citizen's 
Bank v. Willing, 109 Wash. 464, 186 Pac. 1072 (1920). 
30. Continental Can Co. v. Jessamine Canning Co., supra note 29; Citizen's Bank v. 
Willing, supra note 29. 
31. Continental Can Co. v. Jessamine Can Co., 286 Ky. 365, 369, 150 S.W.2d 922, 924 
(1941). 
32. U.C.C. § 7-102(I)(h). 
33. But see SECOND REPORT OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY COMMISSION TO STUDY AND 
REPORT UPON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 512-13 (1960). 
34. The requirement of "profit" meant that the bailee had to be in the business of 
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The danger of defrauding the public, suggested in the above 
quotation, is sharply reduced where the storage arrangement, al-
though not a true warehousing situation, is subject to public regula-
tion of the issuance of receipts. If a state has statutes under which 
receipts for agricultural products or liquor may be issued by an 
owner who is not a warehouseman, the Code recognizes this docu-
ment as a warehouse receipt despite the unorthodox character of the 
issuer.35 In Moore v. Thomas Distilling Co.,36 a distiller had issued 
certificates covering his own goods. There was an over-issue of these 
certificates and the dispute was between a claimant whose certificates 
had been purchased first and a second claimant whose certificates, al-
though purchased later, had been issued first. The court resolved the 
question in favor of the first purchaser, finding the date of the first 
sale and not the date of the first issuance controlling. The irregu-
larity in the character of the issuer thus deprived the supposed ware-
house receipts of their special title-transmitting characteristics. Under 
the Code, however, this irregularity would be immaterial37 and the 
Code rule governing over-issue would apply.38 
A final case involving a factual defect in the character of the is-
suer is Deaux v. Trinidad Bean & Elevator Co.39 This was an action 
involving beans stored with defendant as security for a loan. The 
beans were sold prior to the due date of the loan and the debtor sued 
his creditor for conversion. After judgment in the trial court for the 
plaintiff, the defendant moved for leave to amend its answer to allege 
that it was not engaged in storing goods for profit. The denial of this 
motion was affirmed on appeal: the receipt had fixed the rights of the 
parties irrespective of whether the defendant was a warehouseman. 
This case should surprise no one. The special character of the issuer 
is relevant only when the title-transmitting qualities of the warehouse 
receipt are at issue and a piece of paper can serve as a contract to store 
and return the goods upon a fixed condition even if the promisor is 
not a warehouseman.40 
warehousing and this functional definition is retained by the Code. The profit require-
ment is discussed in In re Hedgeside Distillery Corp., 123 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Cal. 1952). 
35. u.c.c. § 7-201(2). 
36. 247 Pa. 312, 93 Atl. 347 (1915). 
37. Cf. BRAUCHER, DocUMENTS OF TITLE 10 (1958). 
38. U.C.C. § 7-402. Even where there is over-issue, cancellation of the first document 
validates the second. Over-issue does not make the second document perpetually bad. 
See Block v. Oliver, 102 Ky. 269, 43 S.W. 238 (1897); Roche v. Crigler, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 
2378, 67 S.W. 273 (Ct. App. 1902). There is nothing in U.C.C. § 7-402 which would 
prevent a court from reaching the same result under the Code. 
39. 8 Cal. App. 2d 149, 47 P-2d 535 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935). 
40. Cf. U.C.C. § 7-401, discussed at pp. 1374-76 infra. 
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III. DEFECTS IN THE WAREHOUSE RECEIPT 
A. Def eels Generally 
1369 
More common than issuer irregularities are defects in the form 
of the document. Neither the UWRA nor the Code state precisely 
what must be in a warehouse receipt. However, each statute contains 
a list of what are called "essential terms,''41 and courts have the re-
sponsibility for deciding whether the failure to include one or more 
of these terms prevents the piece of paper in question from being a 
valid warehouse receipt. The Code goes somewhat further than the 
UWRA by suggesting some (but not all) of the minimum attributes 
which a warehouse receipt must have if it is to function as a docu-
ment of title.42 
The designation of some items in the UWRA as "essential terms" 
invited the argument that omission of any one of these invalidated 
the receipt. A typical case is Sampsell v. Security-First National Bank 
of Los Angeles,43 in which a debtor deposited goods in a warehouse 
which issued the receipts to a pledgee-bank as security for its loan to 
the debtor. The receipts failed to contain the rate of storage charges 
required by the UWRA and the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy ar-
gued that this omission invalidated the receipts and the pledge. The 
court could not agree: there was no showing of prejudice to any party 
caused by the failure to include the rate of storage and the court did 
not believe that the legislature would want to penalize the holder 
for such a slight defect in the document. 
A similar case is Manufacturer's Merchantile Co. v. Monarch Re-
frigerating Co.,44 in which execution had been levied on warehoused 
goods and the warehouseman was therefore unable to deliver them 
to the holder of a negotiable warehouse receipt. The bailee sought to 
establish that the receipt was non-negotiable so that it would be able 
to claim against the holder of the receipt the excuse of delivery to 
the levying officer. It argued that negotiability had been impaired by 
41. U.C.C. § 7-202(2); U.W.R.A. § 2. 
42. See U.C.C. § 1-201(15). In some instances only purchasers of documents of title 
are entitled to the benefit of a special Code rule. See, e.g., § 7-203 (liability for non-
receipt or misdesaiption). But cf. §§ 7-40I(a); -502 (rights acquired by due negotiation); 
-507 {warranties on negotiation or transfer). In other instances, although the draftsmen 
refer to rights based on a warehouse receipt, the context indicates that they meant a 
warehouse receipt which also satisfied the definition of document of title. See, e.g., 
§§ 7-205 (rights of buyer in ordinary course of business of fungible goods); -207 (over-
issue of receipts for fungible goods; -209(1) (lien of warehouseman). 
43. 92 Cal. App. 648, 207 P.2d 1088 {Dist. Ct. App. 1949). See also Sampsell v. 
Lawrence Warehouse Co., 167 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1948); Smith Bros. v. Richheimer &: 
Co., 145 La. 1066, 83 So. 255 (1919); Arbuthnot, Latham&: Co. v. Richheimer &: Co., 139 
La. 797, 72 So. 251 (1916). 
44. 266 Ill. 584, 107 N.E. 885 (1915). 
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its failure to include the rate of storage charges in the receipt. The 
court did not accept this argument. Beside noting that the receipt 
did not have to be in any particular form, the court relied on a pro-
vision of the UWRA that made the warehouseman liable for damage 
caused by omission of an essential term from a negotiable receipt.45 
Thus it concluded that a warehouse receipt could still be valid de-
spite this type of irregularity. Obviously this reasoning can only be 
carried so far. Despite the statements in both the UWRA and the 
Code that a warehouse receipt does not have to be in any particular 
form, the failure to comply with the statute will at some point be so 
complete that it no longer makes sense to refer to a piece of paper as 
either a receipt, contract of storage, or document of title.46 
Unless the title-transmitting qualities of the document are at is-
sue, 47 irregularities of form generally do not present difficult prob-
lems. In the footnotes of this article I have cited numerous cases in 
which there was a defect in form but in the text I shall speak only 
of a few interesting decisions. One of these is Redmon v. State,48 in 
which the Indiana Supreme Court found that failure to indicate 
where goods were stored, failure to indicate storage charges, and 
failure to number the receipt prevented the item in question from 
being a warehouse receipt. But this was a peculiar case involving the 
prosecution of a warehouseman for embezzlement. The court felt 
that the defendant could not be a warehouseman unless he issued 
a warehouse receipt.49 The character of the document was thus tied 
up with proof of a criminal offense and the court was obviously not 
concerned with the commercial function of the document. Redmon 
stands alone. 
Another case, best classified as involving a defect in form, is Old 
Colony Trust Co. v. Lawyer's Title and Trust Co.50 The defect there 
was that the warehouse receipts required by the terms of a letter of 
45. U.W.R.A. § 2. The same provision appears in U.C.C. § 7-202(2) and is not 
restricted to negotiable documents. 
46. Harry Hall&: Co. v. Consolidated Packing Co., 55 Cal. App. 2d 651, 131 P.2d 
859 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942) (alternative holding); Kramer v. Northwestern Elevator Co., 
91 Minn. 346, 98 N.W. 96 (1904) (UWRA not in force); Investment Serv. Co. v. O'Brien, 
190 Ore. 394, 223 P .2d 163 (1950) (alternative holding); Rodgers v. Murray, 247 S.W. 888 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1923). But cf. Joseph v. P. Viane Co., 118 Misc. 344, 194 N.Y. Supp. 235 
(Sup. Ct. 1922). 
47. See Part III B infra. 
48. 234 Ind. 306, 126 N.E.2d 485 (1955). 
49. This assumption is erroneous. The relationship of depositor and warehouseman 
can exist even where a receipt is not issued. See Hartford Acc. &: Indem. Co. v. State, 
247 F.2d 315 (10th Cir. 1957); Stevens v. Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., 197 Kan. 74, 
415 P.2d 236 (1966); U.C.C. § 7-202, comment. In both of these cases, liability was 
imposed on surety companies although the principal debtor, a warehouseman, had not 
issued warehouse receipts for goods deposited. 
50. 297 Fed. 152 (2d Cir. 1924). 
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credit represented goods that were not actually on deposit with the 
bailee. This was known by the issuer of the letter of credit and it 
refused to accept the proffered receipts. The court held that the is-
suer was justified in insisting upon strict compliance with the terms 
of the credit. Presumably, such reasoning would apply to uphold the 
insistence on the inclusion of essential terms as well as the inclusion, 
as in this case, of a statement known to be false. 
A contrasting case in which much too great an emphasis was 
placed on irregularities of issue is Maxwell v. Winans.51 Here the 
warehouseman sought to take advantage of the right granted by the 
UWRA52 to interplead adverse claimants. One of the defendants ob-
jected to the bill of interpleader, arguing that because the warehouse-
man had not in fact issued a warehouse receipt for the stored goods 
it was not entitled to interplead adverse claimants. In a previous deci-
sion, New Jersey Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Rector,53 the same 
court had rejected a similar argument that the omission of an essen-
tial term (the statement of storage charges) from a warehouse receipt 
deprived the warehouseman of his right to interplead adverse claim-
ants, and had characterized the UWRA as a remedial statute de-
signed to avoid the harsh common law rule which denied a ware-
houseman such a right.54 But the court in Maxwell v. Winans read 
the Rector decision restrictively55 (in effect refusing to follow it), and 
held that the warehouseman was denied the right to invoke section 
17 of the UWRA since no warehouse receipt had been issued. This 
decision seems clearly ·wrong. The benefits of section 17 of the 
UWRA were intended to extend to those engaged in a certain type 
of business-warehousing; they can be engaged in this business even 
though no receipts are issued.56 Unfortunately, there is nothing in 
the text of the Code which indicates disapproval of Maxwell v. Wi-
nans,51 although the comment to section 7-202 states that the ware-
houseman is under no obligation to issue a warehouse receipt. Since 
the opinion in :Maxwell v. Winans emphasizes the fact that no receipt 
had been issued, a court could find that the absence of an affirmative 
duty under the Code to issue a receipt makes the case distinguishable. 
A court which does not feel that Maxwell is so distinguishable would 
be well advised simply not to follow it. 
51. 96 N.J. Eq. 178, 125 Atl. 38 (Ch. 1924). 
52. U.W.R.A. § 17. 
53. 76 N.J. Eq. 587, 75 Atl. 931 (Ct. Err.&: App. 1910). 
54. The availability of this remedy is discussed in Annot., 100 A.L.R. 425 (1936). 
55. It distinguished the case as one of "substantial compliance" but did not explain 
why non-compliance should affect the warehouseman's remedy. 
56. See cases cited note 49 supra. 
57. The comment to U.C.C. § 7-603 states that there has been consolidation of 
previous uniform statutory provisions "without substantial change." 
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B. Defects Involving Title 
Irregularities of form can be serious when title to the warehoused 
goods is involved. A claimant whose rights are based upon a nego-
tiable warehouse receipt must establish both that his receipt is nego-
tiable and that it was properly negotiated to him if he wishes to 
claim the preferred status of a holder through due negotiation.58 
However, absence of an essential term could destroy the negotiable 
character of the document or could support the conclusion that the 
document, although negotiable, was not properly negotiated to the 
claimant.59 To date, neither of these arguments has found much 
support in the decisions. On the contrary, courts are quite often will-
ing to overlook substantial defects in the document when dealing 
with questions of title. In Manufacturer's Merchantile Co. v. Mon-
arch Refrigerating Co., already discussed,60 the failure to state the 
rate of storage charges did not impair negotiability. The Monarch 
decision was read rather broadly in Laube v. Seattle National Bank,61 
in which the failure to state the location of a warehouse62 was not 
enough to invalidate a pledge of the warehouse receipts. The deposi-
tor's trustee in bankruptcy argued that the receipts were invalid on 
their face because they did not indicate where the goods were ware-
housed. The court dismissed this argument and cited Monarch for 
the proposition that the failure to include an essential term was not 
a fatal defect. This simple reading of Monarch may have been erro-
neous for two reasons. First, in Monarch the warehouseman was 
seeking to turn a defect for which it was at least in part responsible 
to its own advantage, and it is understandable that a court would be 
reluctant to permit this.63 Second, and more important, the inade-
quacy of the receipt in Monarch was much less significant than that 
58. u.c.c. § 7-502. 
59. See ILL. REv. STAT. § 7-202, Illinois Code Comment (1963). But cf. Starkey v. 
Nixon, 151 Tenn. 637, 270 S.W. 980 (1924), in which a warehouse receipt (as permitted 
by statute) contained a term limiting storage to one year. The receipts were pledged to 
X who sold them to defendants without authority after the year had expired. Plaintiffs, 
original owners of the receipts, unsuccessfully argued that the receipts could not be 
negotiated after -the year had expired. The court refused to accept the analogy to over-
due commercial paper. 
60. 266 Ill. 584, 107 N.E. 885 (1915); see text accompanying note 44 supra. 
61. 130 Wash. 550, 228 Pac. 594 (1924). 
62. U.C.C. § 7-202(2)(a); U.W.R.A. § 2(a). 
63. In at least six other cases, warehousemen have not been permitted to benefit 
from irregularities for which they were responsible. Citizens' Bank v. Arkansas Compress 
&: Warehouse Co., 80 Ark. 601, 96 S.W. 997 (1906); Deaux v. Trinidad Bean&: Elevator 
Co., 8 Cal. App. 2d 149, 47 P.2d 535 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935); Peoples' Warehouse Co. v. 
Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 74 Ga. App. 67, 38 S.E.2d 855 (1946); Kramer v. North-
western Elevator Co., 91 Minn. 346, 98 N.W. 96 (1904); Granada Cotton Compress Co. 
v. Atkinson, 94 Miss. 93, 47 So. 644 (1908); Nowell v. Seattle Transfer Co., 63 Wash. 685, 
116 Pac. 287 (1911). In the last four cases, the UWRA was not in force. Cf. Green v. 
Fortune, 151 Kan. 598, 100 P.2d 631 (1940). 
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in Laube.64 While not all essential terms need be assigned equal im-
portance (or unimportance), the location of the warehoused goods 
would seem no less important than the physical description in the 
identification of the subject matter of a pledge. In Laube, however, 
there was not much controversy about whether the goods were those 
that had been pledged, and that perhaps explains the decision. But 
there are other cases in which the courts have also been willing to 
accept considerable ambiguity or vagueness in either the description 
of the goods or in the statement of their location.65 Indeed, one court 
has suggested that the only absolutely essential term in a negotiable 
warehouse receipt is the delivery term.66 Even if this statement is not 
accepted, it is obvious that courts under the UWRA have been, and 
under the Code will probably continue to be, very willing to over-
look defects in the form of the warehouse receipt.67 
Sometimes arguments that a particular piece of paper is not a 
warehouse receipt rest not only on the failure to include certain 
terms but also on the absence of intent on the part of the issuer that 
the alleged receipt function as a document of title. For instance, in 
Investment Service Co. v. O'Brien,68 a bailee issued what was termed 
a dock receipt in the name of a bank and the receipt was then 
pledged to the bank as security for a loan. There was a custom in 
the trade that this receipt was only evidence that goods had been 
received on the dock and did not pertain to ownership or title. The 
bailee would issue a warehouse receipt on request but in that case it 
would not move the goods from the dock until there was surrender 
of the warehouse receipt. On these facts the court held that the bailee 
was not liable to the pledgee-bank for misdelivery when it disposed of 
64. Other cases in which the failure to list -the storage charges has been disregarded 
are Sampsell v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 167 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1948); Equitable Trust 
Co. v. White Lumber Co., 41 F.2d 60 (N.D. Idaho 1930); Sampsell v. Security-First 
Nat'! Bank, 92 Cal. App. 2d 648,207 P.2d 1088 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949) (validity of pledge); 
Graham v. Frazier, 82 Ga. App. 185, 60 S.E.2d 833 (1950) (validity of pledge); New 
Jersey Title &: Trust Co. v. Rector, 76 N.J. Eq. 587, 75 Atl. 931 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1910); 
Finn v. Erickson, 127 Ore. 107,267 Pac. 232 (1928). 
65. Graham v. Frazier, supra note 64; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Sharp 
Motor Sales, 233 Ky. 290, 25 S.W.2d 405 (1930); Swedish-Am. Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'! 
Bank, 89 Minn. 98, 94 N.W. 218 (1903) (UWRA not in effect); Starkey v. Nixon, 151 
Tenn. 637,270 S.W. 980 (1924). But see Interstate Banking&: Trust Co. v. Brown, 235 
Fed. 32 (6th Cir. 1916). 
66. Equitable Trust Co. v. White Lumber Co., 41 F.2d 60, 61 (N.D. Idaho 1930). 
67. Joseph v. P. Viane Co., 118 Misc. 344, 194 N.Y. Supp. 235 (Sup. Ct. 1922), goes 
too far in disregarding irregularities of form. Other courts have found that the absence 
of a delivery term combined with other omissions will prevent the document in question 
from functioning as a warehouse receipt. Graves v. Garvin, 272 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1959) 
(parol evidence rule not applied); Investment Serv. Co. v. O'Brien, 190 Ore. 394, 223 
P.2d 163 (1950) (alternative holding); State Bank v. Almira Farmer's Warehouse Co., 123 
Wash. 354, 212 Pac. 543 (1923). 
68. 190 Ore. 394, 223 P .2d 163 (1950). 
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the goods in accordance with the wishes of the pledgor-owner. The 
court said that the document was not a warehouse receipt, not only 
because it did not contain certain terms, but also because the parties 
did not intend that it should be a warehouse receipt. In another case 
the seller of raisins issued items bearing the label "warehouse re-
ceipt" to a buyer who in turn resold these items to a third party.69 
When the second buyer asserted his right to these goods, the seller 
claimed a set-off arising out of a separate transaction with the orig-
inal buyer. The court held that this could be done, as the documents 
issued by the seller were not intended by the parties to be warehouse 
receipts, even though so labeled. 
The courts in these two cases were concerned with function as 
well as with form. No mention of function was contained in the 
UWRA but, under the Code, if an item is to serve as a document of 
title,70 its function becomes important. 
"Document of Title" includes bill of lading, dock warrant, dock 
receipt, warehouse receipt or order £or the delivery of goods, and 
also any other document which the regular course of business or 
financing is treated as adequately evidencing that the person in 
possession of it is entitled to receive, hold and dispose of the docu-
ment and the goods it covers.11 
Often function and form will be closely related. Thus, a document 
which does not possess many essential terms will probably not be 
one which is intended to function as a document of title. But the 
Code makes it clear that, even if formal requirements apparently are 
met, there still must be a custom that the item in question serve as 
a document of title. 
IV. THE CODE PROVISIONS COVERING CONSEQUENCES 
OF IRREGULARITY 
The most difficult question under both the UWRA and the Code 
is not determining whether there has been an irregularity in the 
issuance of a warehouse receipt, but rather deciding what effect, if 
any, the irregularity should have upon the issue in the particular 
case. One of the changes found in Article Seven is the instruction 
that some irregularities should be disregarded in certain instances. 
Thus, section 7-401 states: 
69. Harry Hall &: Co. v. Consolidated Packing Co., 55 Cal. App. 651, 131 P.2d 859 
(Dist. Ct. App. 1942). 
70. The situations in which document of title (as opposed to warehouse receipt) is a 
significant concept are listed in note 42 supra. 
71. U.C.C. § 1·201(15). (Emphasis added.) 
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The obligations imposed by this Article on an issuer apply to a 
document of title regardless of the fact that 
(a) the document may not comply with the requirements of this 
Article or of any other law or regulation regarding its issue, 
form, or content; or 
(b) the issuer may have violated laws regulating the conduct of 
his business; or 
(c) the goods covered by the document were owned by the bailee 
at the time the document was issued; or 
(d) the person issuing the document does not come within the 
definition of a warehouseman if it purports to be a ware-
house receipt. 
This section is desirable. It deprives an issuer of the benefit of 
defenses which it might seek to create out of its own wrongful activ-
ity and is generally in accord with existing case law.72 Its interpreta-
tion does, however, raise two problems. 
First, what effect will it have on the liability of surety companies 
that provide bonds conditioned on the faithful performance of the 
warehouseman's obligation? Surety companies sometimes seek., with 
occasional success, to avoid liability on the theory that the bond does 
not cover illegal activity of the warehouseman. Does section 7-401(b) 
deprive the surety of the opportunity to so argue? It should not, for 
the cases in which the surety has successfully raised the defense of 
illegality are those in which the claimant under the bond had knowl-
edge of the ·wrongdoing,73 while those in which the claimant was 
successful contain no evidence of such knowledge.74 Courts are obvi-
ously concerned that the protection of indemnity be given to those 
who can be expected to be harmed by illegal warehousing operations, 
and this concern is reflected in section 7-401(b). But there is no need 
to extend the protection of the surety bond to those who have parti-
cipated or acquiesced in the wrongful activity. 
Second, since the definition of warehouseman in the Code is so 
broad, it is hard to imagine situations in which a person not meeting 
the definition of a warehouseman issues what purports to be a ware-
house receipt and assumes issuer obligations under 7-401(d). Prob-
ably the only significant case it covers is one in which a person who 
is not a warehouseman issues a receipt for his own goods. However, 
72. See authorities cited note 63 supra. 
73. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. State, 247 F.2d 315 (10th Cir. 1957); United States 
v. Merchants Mut. Bonding Co., 242 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. Iowa 1965); People v. Farmer's 
Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., 74 Ill. App. 2d 1, 220 N.E.2d 585 (1966); Stevens v. Farmer's 
Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., 197 Kan. 74, 415 P.2d 236 (1966) (federally licensed warehouse); 
State v. Interstate Sur. Co., 48 S.D. 57, 201 N.W. 717 (1924). 
74. Central Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 324 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963); 
Central States Corp. v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 237 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1956). 
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even under section 7-40l(d) it is not just any receipt which will im-
pose issuer obligations, for the document must purport to be a ware-
house receipt, and it must have some of the essential terms listed in 
section 7-202. In the California case of Harry Hall & Co. v. Consoli-
dated Packing Co., already discussed,75 the seller of raisins issued 
documents labeled "warehouse receipt" which it knew the buyer 
intended to transfer to a purchaser for value. These documents, de-
scribing certain raisins, were in fact sold by the buyer to the plaintiff. 
Defendant seller refused plaintiff's demand for delivery, claiming the 
right to retain the raisins in settlement of an unrelated claim it had 
against the original buyer. The seller's position was sustained by the 
court, which held that the documents could not be enforced as ware-
house receipts, even though so labeled, as they were not intended to 
serve that function. Section 7-40l(d) would not change the result in 
such a case unless a court were willing to hold that merely desig-
nating documents as "warehouse receipts" fulfills the statutory re-
quirement that they "purport to be such."76 
Section 7-401 deals only with the effect of irregularities upon 
issuer obligations. Far more sweeping is the declaration in section 
10-10477 that violations of laws regulating the bailee's services or 
prescribing the form of documents of title do not affect the status of 
a document of title. The key phrase here is "status of a document of 
title." To explore the meaning of this phrase, suppose that a state 
statute regulating the issuance of warehouse receipts for agricultural 
products requires that certain information about the grade or class 
of the stored products be included in the receipt.78 What would be 
the effect of omitting this information from a receipt for such 
goods? Such an omission would be a violation of the state statute 
which, under the terms of section 10-104, is supposed "not [to] affect 
75. 55 Cal. App. 651, 131 P.2d 859 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942); see text accompanying note 
69 supra. 
76. § 7-40l(d) calls for a reference to the purchaser's state of mind. U.W.R.A. § 7 
called for a similar subjective determination of whether the purchaser of a non-
negotiable warehouse receipt not clearly stamped "non-negotiable" did in fact suppose 
it was negotiable. Although the issue was discussed in Lynn Storage Warehouse Co. v. 
Senator, 3 F.2d 558 (1st Cir. 1925), it was never clear what would justify such a belief. 
CAL. Coi.u.r. CODE § 1201(45) (West 1964), provides that labeling a document "ware-
house receipt" is conclusive evidence of the intention of the issuer that the person 
entitled under the document has the right to transfer ,the goods. Thus, in California, an 
item labeled "warehouse receipt" may purport to be one under § 7-40l(d) despite all 
other irregularities of form. This would mean that Harry Hall &: Co. v. Consolidated 
Packing Co., 55 Cal. App. 651, 131 P.2d 859 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942), would be decided 
differently under the California version of the Code. 
77. Quoted at text accompanying note 25 supra. 
78. E.g., 34 IowA ConE § 543.18 (1962), as amended, Iowa Acts 1965, No. 61 G.A., ch. 
413, § 10124. 
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the status of a document of title." But at the same time it could be 
argued that the omission of the required term was sufficient to warn 
a purchaser of possible irregularities in the warehousing transaction 
and thus deprive him of the preferred position of a holder through 
due negotiation. In such a case it would be necessary to determine 
whether section 10-104- states a substantive principle with respect to 
the effect of irregularity which justifies reaching a result different 
from that which would be reached were any other section of the 
Code applied. 
There is no indication that the draftsmen of the Code intended 
to adopt such a sweeping change. It was necessary to take cognizance 
of the many laws regulating the warehousing business, for if these 
laws had not been mentioned, there would always have been the 
question of whether they were repealed by implication. Since they 
were not to be repealed by the Code, the alternative of silence (itself 
undesirable) was not available. On the other hand, the Code could 
not be made to conform to these many laws, since this would have 
caused too much variation in versions of the Code from state to 
state. The solution chosen was to continue the co-existence that pre-
vailed when the UWRA was in force: the reference to "status of a 
document" expresses the thought that no greater or lesser signifi-
cance should be given to violations of these collateral laws than 
would have been given to them prior to adoption of the Code. The 
Code position in section 10-104- is neutral. Thus, in the above ex-
ample, the issue of due negotiation should not be affected by section 
10-104-, and the question, therefore, is simply whether the omission 
of a term required by a collateral statute prevents due negotiation 
from taking place. Cases decided to date do not provide a clear an-
swer to this question.79 
Conclusion 
There has been a substantial but not extraordinary amount of 
litigation in which defects in the character of the issuer or in the 
form of the warehouse receipt have been raised. However, consider-
ing the number of warehousing transactions that take place each 
year, the relative amount must be regarded as small. Much of this is 
due to the professionalism of those who issue warehouse receipts and 
those who deal in them. Furthermore, the question of irregularity 
is one which is hard to raise, at least in a manner which promises 
79. The only case close to the issue is Starkey v. Nixon, 151 Tenn. 637, 270 S.W. 980 
(1925), discussed in note 59 supra. 
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much chance of success. Unless the warehousing transaction has 
been incredibly mishandled, it is difficult to argue that those irregu-
larities which have occurred ought to have a significant effect on the 
outcome of the case. The courts generally have reached common-
sense solutions and have not permitted themselves to be carried 
away by arguments that often are most sophist in character. The 
bailment-sale cases, with their sometimes uncritical acceptance of 
arguments based on irregularities in the character of the issuer, are 
fortunately rare. 
The Code, with its broadened definition of issuers, can be ex-
pected to reduce litigation somewhat, but there will always be de-
fects in the documents themselves. Apart from section 7-401, dealing 
with issuer obligations, there are no guidelines in the Code for re-
lating irregularity to the rights of those involved in warehousing 
transactions. The draftsmen of the Code could not go further than 
they did in section 7-401 because it is impossible to predict a con-
sistent context in which irregularities may occur. As in the past, it 
will be necessary to rely on the ability of judges to reject contentions 
based on irregularity, which seek to promote slight variations from 
statutory norms into victory. There is nothing in the last half century 
of decisions that indicates that reliance on the judiciary will not be 
a generally satisfactory way of solving the problems posed by irregu-
larities of all types. 
